SYNOPSIS

TITLE:- NAVYA NYĀYA CONCEPT OF PRATYAKṢA PRAMĀNA: A CRITICAL STUDY

(With Special Reference to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha nyāya- Pancānana and Gangeśa Upādhyāya)

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INTRODUCTION :-

All the classical School that advanced epistemologies accepts perception as a knowledge source although there is much disagreement about its nature, object and limitation. From the Nyāya stand point perception is an immediate valid cognition. Cognition of reality, due to some kind of sense object contact. As such perception involves four operative conditions or causes, namely object, senses, mind and self. To be question: What object can be perceived and how they are perceived by us. Here We propose to consider, the Navya Naiyāyika stand point, the psychological question as to the nature and function of sense, mind and self in perception. It is generally admitted that perception is primarily conditioned by the activity of the sense in relation to some object. Hence perception is usually defined in terms of sense stimulation. Even those who refuse to do so have to admit sense activity as a factor conditioning all perception. But there is some differences opinion as to the exact nature of the sense and their functions sense are the external object occupying different parts of the surface of the body. The visual sense for example is the eye of pupil, since objects can be seen only. For the Jainas a sense is the physical organ with a specific energy. According to the samkhya the sense are not physical bodies like the eye of pupil, but modification of the subtle material principle called ohaṁkara. They think that a physical organ can′t account for the perception of distant object. In perception the sense must

function in direct contact with the object of perception. But physical organ like the eye pupil can´t have direct contact with an objection lying at a distance or behind a glass. Mimāms and Vedānta in holding that the senses are neither the end organs pervading subtle matter. According to these system the external senses are material substances. Constituted by the physical element and localized in the different end organs. In the Nyāya system a sense is defined as super sensible organ of Knowledge having it locus in the animal organism. A sense can´t itself be sensed or perceived. The existence of sense is not a matter of direct perception for us.

CONCEPT OF PRATYAKṢA PRAMĀNA IN INDIAN TRADITION :

All the school of Indian philosophy both Āstika and Nāstika accept pratyakṣa as source of valid knowledge. Thus Cārvākas hold that perception is the only pramāna or dependable source of valid knowledge. The perceptual knowledge is so vivid that there arises no questions about its validity. The world of our perception is the only reality. Hence the Cārvāka reject the reality of heaven and held as they are not object of our perception.

From the view point the Jainas Valid Knowledge have been treated in two ways, namely agamic tradition and logical tradition. From the agamic tradition and logical tradition. From the agamic point of view, determinate knowledge has been devied into live types namely mati, śruta, avadhi, manah-paryāya and Kevala. From the view point of direct logical tradition Valid determinate knowledge have been classified into two: pratyakṣa or direct and parokṣa or indirect. Bhadravāhu in his Āvasaka-nirukti, follows the agamic tradition, while Nyāyavatra of Siddhasena Divākar follow the logical tradition.

The Buddhist define perception as the unerring cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all ideate. In it the object of cognition is a unique individual and the processes of cognition is mere sensing without only element of ideation (Kalpanā),

Samkara refers to three source of Valid knowledge: perception, inference, scriptural testimony. Latter Writers add comparison and negation. In the Advaita Vedānta perception as a pramāna is the unique cause of perception as a form of valid knowledge. According to Advaita Vedānta Perception is the direct consciousness of object obtained generally through the exercise of the sense. In perception the transparent antahkarana goes out through the sense organ pervades the object.

According to Vaiśesika valid knowledge is what apprehend an object in its real nature invalid knowledge is what apprehend an object as different from it. Four kind of valid knowledge are admitted according to vaiśesika which are perception, inference, remembrance (Sṁrti) and intuitive knowledge (Arsajñana)

Jamini's aphorism 'sat saṁprayoge purusasy endriyānām buddhi jñanamatat pratyakṣam animittaṁ Vidyamanopalambhanat,' from the basis of mimāmsa theory of perception.

The Samkhyasutra defines perception as that discernment which being in conjunction of an object portrays the form there. As regards the classical source of samkhya- yoga.

According to Goutam the definition of perception is as follows perception is cognition resulting form sense object contact which is expenessible by words, which is not erroneous and it is determinate.

The Nyāya Vaiśesika definition of pratyakṣa generally insists feature and that it is invariably the result of a Special type of relation called sannikarsa between a sense and an object. In order to cover nitya pratyakṣa also perception is defined as a cognition which Does not arise through the instrumentally of cognition. This definition is quoted in Taṭṭa cintāmani by Gangeśa Upādhyāya.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS:

Most classical Indian philosophical School accept perception as the primary means of knowledge. But differ from the nature, kinds and object of perceptual knowledge. Are the object of perception internal on external? Are they restricted to individual or Universal? How about relation? Goutam used the term 'avyapadesyam' in his definition of pratyakṣa pramāna, which means not expressible by words which the Naiyāyikas call the indeterminate knowledge. According to Nyāya and Mimāmsa School indeterminate knowledge is not pramāna, they have reasonably accepted the logical point of view. So how will it be included in the pratyakṣa pramāna? The Nyāya stand point absenses is realized directly, but with the absences and sense contact create by alaukika pratyakṣa. So why do not they include the absenses of alaukika pratyakşa? Sṁrtijñana is necessary for the recognition. But why would the recognition be considered only in the pratyakṣa pramāna? Here are issues about perception such as light and ether, akasa, the purported medium of sound and about what is perceptible Yogically?

CHAPTERISATION :

1. Introduction.

2. Prācina Nyāya concept of pratyakṣa pramāna.

3. Dharmakirti's concept of pratyakṣa pramāna.
4. Nārāyana Bhaṭṭa concept of pratyakṣa pramāna.
5. Dharmarājādhvrindra concept of pratyakṣa pramāna.
6. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Viśvanāth's and Gangeśa Upādhyāya Concept of pratyaksa pramana.
7. Evaluation and concluding remarks.

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